Irak, Medio Oriente y Asia

La captura de Saddam Hussein

Autor: Editorial

Fecha: 14/12/2003

Traductor: Celeste Murillo, especial para P.I.

Fuente: Stratfor

The Capture of Saddam Hussein

Summary

Saddam Hussein has been captured in Iraq. This is the single most important event in Iraq since the end of major hostilities. It is not clear whether Hussein had operational control of the guerrillas, but it is clear that he was the symbol not only of resistance, but of American impotence. Moreover, whether in active control or not, he knows a great deal about the guerrilla movement, and the guerrillas cannot know whether he will talk. That means the guerrillas are in crisis, and their future is in doubt. It also means that in order to demonstrate their ongoing determination, they will have to retaliate soon -- and hard.


Analysis

Saddam Hussein has been captured in Iraq. Most wars do not turn on the fate of any one man -- and in the end, Hussein's capture might not be decisive in ending the war, but it is certainly going to be significant. It will undermine, probably to a great extent, the fighting capacity of the guerrillas, certainly in the medium term.

Hussein had become a symbol of the resistance and of the failure of U.S. intelligence. So long as he was free, the guerrillas could take comfort in the idea that American forces were blind. However, as we have argued over the past weeks, that blindness had been subsiding. Hussein's capture proves that to a great extent, U.S intelligence in Iraq has penetrated the opacity of the guerrillas. If the United States could find Hussein, its forces could operate more effectively against the guerrillas.

That has to have a major effect on guerrilla morale. The best fighting force in the world -- and the Iraqi guerrillas are far from that -- needs hope of victory. The Iraqi guerrillas' hope of victory turned on the impotence of U.S. intelligence. The United States was able to destroy whatever it could see. If its vision had improved to the point of seeing and capturing Hussein, then it has improved enough to engage the guerrillas directly. The guerrillas must, as individuals, now be recalculating the probability of victory.

In addition, Hussein knows a great deal about the guerrillas' structure and plans. Even if he was not in direct operational command of the guerrillas, he certainly knows a great deal. The fact that he was taken alive rather than killed says a great deal about U.S. intentions to interrogate him. If he talks -- and while that is uncertain, we suspect the interrogation will be effective even if it does not resort to physical torture -- the United States will become even more effective in terms of intelligence.

Moreover, the guerrillas cannot possibly know whether he is going to talk. They must assume the worst-case scenario. Therefore, the guerrilla command must be calculating at this moment precisely what Hussein knows. Once they determine that -- and they will not be able to be certain what he does know -- they will have to make speedy adjustments in deployment and methods to counter what is likely to be a very rapid series of U.S. strikes based on that fact.

Others in Iraq, particularly the Shia, will see the capture of Hussein as potentially leading to a diminution in guerrilla operations among the Sunnis and, therefore, a potential decline in their own importance to Washington. They have been holding out in several areas before finalizing a deal with the United States. The value of that deal might decline in the coming days or weeks. At this point, the United States does not know what the consequences of Hussein's capture will be. Neither do the Shia, but they will have to calculate the worst from their point of view: the decline of the guerrilla threat. The pressure on the Shia to close the deal is now more intense than it was before.

In the short run, the threat from the guerrillas actually increases. They cannot go quiet: Regardless of his importance in their campaign, the capture of Hussein forces them to increase operations if possible. If they go quiet, it will result in serious doubts among the ranks about the survival of the movement and the possibilities of defections or simple desertions. In order to prevent this, the guerrillas will need to strike quickly and effectively. Over the next 72 hours, the threat of counterattacks in Iraq will be substantial.

In the long run, the outcome is not at all clear. The guerrilla command certainly did not depend solely on Hussein. The movement's leaders might well be able to hold things together if they can get through the next few weeks. However, if the resistance continues, it is likely to strengthen the hand of foreign Islamist fighters over the indigenous, secular, Baathist guerrillas. As -- if -- these latter decline in strength and the war continues, their influence over the movement is likely to rise.

Under any circumstances, this is a massive psychological blow to the guerrillas -- and guerrilla war depends heavily upon psychological factors. The capture increases the credibility of the United States dramatically and raises doubts about the viability of the guerrillas. There is no downside to the United States on this one -- save for inevitable criticisms as to whether he was treated humanely, which will start coming out of Europe in a matter of days.

What to do with him is an interesting question. Following interrogation, he will be tried. He could be tried in Iraq, although the outcome there is uncertain, and the internal pressures could be substantial. An interesting choice would be to try him at The Hague. What makes that important is that, in spite of being an organ of the United Nations, the international war crimes tribunal is a heavily European institution in many respects. Sending him to The Hague would force the Europeans to take primary responsibility for judging Hussein. In so doing, it could shift European public opinion and the view of national governments.

U.S. President George W. Bush certainly needed this capture from a political standpoint. The vision of helplessness that had plagued U.S. policy in Iraq can be reversed by this action, assuming that any guerrilla counterattack is managed effectively and explained publicly. In any event, Bush will now be able to claim that in spite of his critics, he has quietly been pursuing the war and that the effectiveness of this strategy is now showing itself.

This might not have been a decisive day for the United States in the war, but it was not a trivial day. Indeed, it is reasonable to argue that this is the most important event since the end of major combat activities was announced. We will now find out what the guerrillas are made of -- and whatever the answer, that will be the most important piece of intelligence available. Good, bad or indifferent, U.S. leaders have got to know how resilient the guerrillas are. And they are about to find out.