Intelectuales y Académicos

2003: el año de Bush

Autor: Immanuel Wallerstein

Fecha: 7/1/2004

Traductor: R. Vera Herrera- para La Jornada

Fuente: Fernand Braudel Center

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University

http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm




Commentary No. 128, Jan. 1, 2004

"2003 - The Year of Bush"




The year 2003 is the year in which George W. Bush left his mark on the world. As the 2004 New Year began, he was probably celebrating it. But in actuality it was a disastrous year - for Bush, for the United States, and for the world. What Bush sought to demonstrate was that the United States could and would assert its power unilaterally in the world, succeed militarily in doing so, and thereby strengthen its political and economic position in the world. The U.S. would show it was the superpower, if not one that was respected, then at least one that was feared - by friend and foe alike. Has he succeeded? I think not.

Let us look at the year's events from Bush's point of view. The year started out rather badly. In February, the U.S. sought international legitimation for its war on Iraq via a resolution of the U.N. Security Council. Despite heavy lobbying, including repeated telephone calls by the president himself, the U.S. was unable to secure more than four votes (out of 15) for such a resolution and hence withdrew it. In March, the U.S. invaded Iraq anyway, with a "coalition of the willing" - essentially Great Britain, Australia, and Poland. At the last minute, Turkey, despite the large monetary bribe that it was offered, refused to take part.

The military operation was nonetheless swift, and by May the U.S. had occupied, more or less, all of Iraq. Bush proclaimed that the mission had been "accomplished." But as soon as he said that, the guerilla war began, and has been growing in strength ever since. More U.S. troops have been killed and many more wounded since the mission was "accomplished" than in the first phase, and as the year ended the U.S. armed forces admitted that the rate of casualties was mounting, not diminishing. Although the U.S. has worked hard to get other countries to send troops, its success has been quite limited. As a result, the U.S. has not yet been able to reduce its own troop commitment.

December brought one bright quasi-military achievement, the capture of Saddam Hussein. The head of the U.S. occupation, Paul Bremer, announced: "Ladies and gentlemen, we got him." And so they had. But since this was not a child's game of hide and seek, it is not clear that the capture of Hussein solved many problems for the U.S. It was no doubt a psychological boost, especially inside the U.S. But did it reduce resistance to the U.S. occupation? It may possibly have been discouraging to some Baathist loyalists, although this remains to be proved. But, on the other hand, it liberated those Iraqis who had previously hesitated to fight against the U.S. only because they feared Hussein's return. Iraqi nationalism, after all, is not dependent on Saddam Hussein. In any case, the last weeks of December showed a considerable increase in violent attacks on the occupying forces.

How did Bush fare on the world economic and political front? Economically, the war brought about the so-called Baghdad boost, allowing for a spurt of economic growth worldwide. This was in large part the result of U.S. military Keynesianism. But there are two downsides to be noticed. The economic growth has largely benefited the wealthy. It did not result in a reduction in unemployment, either in the United States or elsewhere, or in an increase in real income for the working strata. So the longer-term impact on effective demand is in doubt. And, even more important, the dollar has been careening downward.

The downward slide of the dollar is to be sure an economic plus in the very short run for Bush (that is, in the electoral year of 2004). It permits an increase in U.S. exports and a reduction in real terms of the external debt. It may have stanched a further boost in unemployment. But a strong dollar is in the end a powerful political and economic tool, and the U.S. cannot afford to have a weak dollar for very long. But can it do anything to reverse the downslide? To cover the external accounts deficit, the U.S. borrows money by selling its bonds each month. Up to 2003, it was able to sell enough to cover its increasing deficit, and hence make possible the incredible financial transfers to U.S. corporations and its wealthiest citizens.

But, as the dollar began to lost significant value, the rest of the world began to hesitate to throw good money after bad by continuing to buy bonds whose value was plummeting. The U.S. deficit is no longer being covered by dollar inflow, which poses dilemmas for the U.S. Treasury. And the situation is kept from total immediate disaster only by the decision of East Asian governments (and particularly China) to continue to buy U.S. Treasury notes. China (and Japan and South Korea) do this out of self-interest of course. But their investment in dollars puts them at risk as well, and they may soon decide that the advantages are outweighed by the dangers to their own resources. In any case, the United States is now dependent on them for its continuing economic health, not vice versa, which is hardly a position of economic strength. And meanwhile, the U.S. is up for sale to outside investors, the inverse of what the U.S. would like the situation to be.

Politically, the situation is not much better. The war in Iraq marked a turning-point in U.S. political relations with Europe. France, Germany, and Russia have shifted from being recalcitrant allies to being uncomfortable but systematic political rivals. They act warily with the United States, not collusively. This means that, while they may from time to time go along with something the U.S. proposes, the U.S. can no longer count on them in a pinch. The repayment of the Iraqi debt is a case in point. James Baker seems to have obtained commitments from the European and East Asian debtors to renounce some part of the Iraqi debt. These countries may have despaired of being paid in any case, and they may yet exact concessions about rights to future arrangements with Iraq as the price of debt cancellation, when the detailed negotiations take place. Baker has not yet gotten the Arab states, who are the biggest creditors, to do the same. It should not be forgotten that one of the motives of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to annul the debt owed to Kuwait.

It is now being openly said that western Europe is not ready to become once again faithful followers of American leadership. Most political figures, even the more conservative ones, believe U.S. policy in the Middle East is fundamentally flawed - not only in Iraq, but in Afghanistan, in Iran, and in Israel/Palestine. If either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia blows up in the face of the United States, there will be Schadenfreude in most European capitals, even in eastern Europe.

Last but certainly not least, the electoral campaign promises to be very difficult for George Bush. At the moment, he is counting primarily on the curtailment of the deflation threat and the capture of Saddam Hussein to propel his campaign forward. But Bush has raised hackles not only in the rest of the world. He has aroused a sleepy U.S. electorate to passionate political involvement. He has his devoted following, but for a significant portion of the American population, he arouses the strongest possible opposition. There will undoubtedly be some swing voters attracted by his patriotic rhetoric. But there are also large numbers (probably larger numbers) of often non-voting youths, greens, Blacks, and Latinos who have become deeply fearful of a Bush second term and are ready to vote this time, especially for Dean.

The year 2004 may not be the year of Bush.

Immanuel Wallerstein