Irak, Medio Oriente y Asia

Irán: ¿Pura Retórica por parte de Clérigo Anti-Americano?

Fecha: 7/1/2004

Traductor: Analí T.B., especial para P.I.

Fuente: Stratfor

Iran: Anti-U.S. Cleric Blowing Hot Air?
Jan 05, 2004

Summary

In a scathing attack on Washington, the head of Iran's Guardians Council said Jan. 2 that U.S. aid to the victims of the Bam earthquake did not mean that U.S.-Iranian relations were warming. Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati's remarks are meant for domestic consumption -- part of efforts by hard-line clerics to maintain power in upcoming parliamentary elections. Such statements will not change ongoing U.S.-Iranian dealings, but they do underscore a shift in the debate in Iran from traditionalists-versus-modernists to an intra-traditionalist affair.

Analysis

Anti-American rhetoric heated up in Iran on Jan. 2 when Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati said that his country's acceptance of U.S. relief aid to quake-stricken Bam did not mean that U.S.-Iranian relations were improving. He questioned Washington's intentions, saying, "If you had any honor, humanity or mercy, you would do better to have pity on the Iraqi and Palestinian peoples for whom you have caused an earthquake."

Jannati's harsh remarks will not have any bearing on the ongoing cooperation between Tehran and Washington. However, they are illustrative of efforts by traditional/conservative clerics to hold on to power in parliamentary elections scheduled for Feb. 20. Unelected clerics such as Jannati, who leads Iran's Guardians Council and is a member of the Expediency Council (the country's highest clerical body), see growing proximity to the United States as a threat.

The ayatollah's comments also highlight a shift in the political debate in Iran to an intra-traditionalist issue. Many members of Jannati's traditionalist camp appear to be moving to the political center, which could have immense implications for the clerics' role in the Iranian political system.

Jannati and his conservative colleagues certainly are concerned about the U.S. presence in Iraq and the behind-the-scenes dealings between Washington and Tehran. They might be either unable or unwilling to block their government's cooperation with Washington. Regardless of this, Jannati's comments are not intended to thwart U.S.-Iranian dealings. His anti-U.S. statements, though anomalous in light of ongoing back-channel cooperation over Iraq, are not an indication of a schism in Tehran. In other words, his remarks do not represent a threat to U.S-Iranian cooperation on Iraq.

Jannati's goal is not to go after the United States itself, but to strengthen his faction's position. The traditionalists have chosen a two-pronged strategy: He is using the modernists' cooperation with Washington as a campaign tactic, and he is trying to convince other traditionalists that aligning with Washington -- like the modernists are doing -- puts the clerics' power at risk. Thus, Jannati's statements should be seen in the context of the electioneering process that is under way ahead of the parliamentary elections. Clerics like Jannati are worried that the upcoming elections will be yet another opportunity for the rival modernist camp of reform-minded clerics to undermine them. The perception among traditionalist clerics that the modernist camp has been successful in creating a rift among the conservatives is exacerbating the problem.

Jannati worries that his opponents have gained influence among some of his prominent partisans -- such as head of the National Security Council Ayatollah Hassan Rohani, who recently played an instrumental role in forging the deal with the IAEA, which allows the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency to conduct snap inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities. Even more alarming for traditionalists is that growing relations with the United States are coming about with the approval of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. Jannati and others view the dealings with Washington as strengthening the hand of the modernists, whose de facto leader is President Mohammed Khatami. Such periodic statements caution traditionalists like Rohani and Khamenei that they need to realize their folly, lest they end up strengthening the opposing camp.

In his Dec. 12 Friday sermon, Jannati publicly contradicted Khatami when he said, "They are lying. Do not be fooled by them. Leave democracy alone." Jannati made these remarks in response to comments Khatami made while addressing a seminar Dec. 11 on religious tolerance organized by the World Council of Churches in Geneva. Khatami said, "I think democracy is the only alternative. We can take it as Muslims. We must accept this has been materialized in the West. We must accept this as Muslims." Jannati understands that close proximity to the United States strengthens the hands of those who would want to weaken the power of the clerics.

The Iranian political system is a strange hybrid of parliamentary democracy and theocracy. The clash between the democrats and the theocrats was inevitable, given the manner in which its founder, the late Ayatollah Khomeini, crafted the system. Thus far, both sides, wary of the possibility that their feud might threaten the status quo, have successfully managed conflict. Nevertheless, neither allows an opportunity to pass to undermine the other side.

The Guardians Council screens candidates for parliamentary elections in an effort to block the election of those who would oppose the power of oversight the clerics enjoy. Thus far, the council has been able to control the legislature, but it is uncertain whether it can continue to do so given the circumstances.

Jannati recently emphasized that it was the duty of pious and competent individuals to seek election to the Majlis (parliament). With such statements, he is trying to keep out of parliament those who challenge the clerics' authority. The GC has gone so far as to send a letter to the Interior Ministry threatening it to reveal the details of its vote-counting mechanisms -- or the council "will have to take necessary action."

Jannati is no ordinary cleric, but he is able to use the venue of the Friday sermon at Tehran University campus. This speaks volumes about the importance Jannati and his comrades place on this issue. Clearly, he had Khamenei's tacit support to make these anti-American statements. But this raises the question of why Khamenei would allow Jannati to use such radical rhetoric when behind-the-scenes U.S.-Iranian negotiations are proceeding well?

The Iranian political system, though not exactly a democracy, is heavily rooted in the notion of collective leadership. Although the unelected traditionalist clerics still maintain absolute control in the Islamic republic, over the years this hold has been challenged by the modernist camp, which has necessitated the need for consensus on major political decisions. Supreme Leader Khamenei and some of his fellow clerics in the hierarchy have acted as mediators in the quest for equilibrium in the system. The problem, however, is that those acting as mediators are members of the traditionalist camp. Ideally, Khamenei would want to be in a position where he, removed from partisan politics, could influence both sides to his own advantage. The difficulty is that he cannot afford to do this because he is an unelected leader whose authority has been challenged by modernists advocating greater democratization. Khamenei realizes that on his own he is nothing, considering that he has senior marjiya (Shia scholars with first rank authority who are considered worthy of emulation) opposing him. Therefore, he depends upon his group for political survival.

What further forces Khamenei to consider what his fellow hardliners are saying is the fear that if they were not united, it would strengthen the Khatami camp. At the same time, because of his position at the apex of the clerical establishment, both sides try to get Khamenei to see things their way in an effort at consensus-building. This allows different players to wield power to varying degrees depending upon their position in the configuration of the hierarchy, which explains why Khamenei goes along with the actions of people like Jannati, who is currently the senior most public face of the traditionalist clerics. In essence, both sides try to exercise influence on the Supreme Leader.

In fact, until very recently Khamenei led the traditionalist camp. With the growth of the reform movement among the clerics over the years, Khamenei has had to step out of his position as head of the unelected establishment in order to do business with the elected modernists. Moreover, the dramatic geopolitical changes brought about by Sept. 11, 2001 -- particularly the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the U.S. occupation of Iraq -- have forced Khamenei to make deals with the United States, which further prevents him from openly leading the conservative clerics. Therefore, he has conveniently allowed others -- such as Hujjat al-Islam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who heads the Expediency Council, and Jannati -- to assume the public face of his camp.

By making these moves, the traditionalists are trying to urge caution to Khamenei and their fellow ideologues who have become interested in dealing with Washington. They are trying to send a message that such contact can undermine their hold on power. The Bush administration announced Jan. 2 that it was ready to send a humanitarian delegation headed by Sen. Elizabeth Dole to Tehran. Iran rejected the idea, saying that Washington needs to do more before any further progress can be made.

Although Washington appears to be ready to publicize it dealings with Iran, the same cannot be said about Tehran. It is quite possible that the traditionalist camp might have had some bearing on Iran's rejection of the U.S. offer. In any case, both sides are going to try to appear not to be compromising core values -- especially when they actually are. This is where Jannati's remarks are useful to Khamenei in giving the impression that Tehran is not ready to compromise its ideological position.

Iran and the United States, at some point in the future, will move toward some semblance of normalcy in their bilateral relations. In the meantime, Tehran and Washington will face opposition from key segments of their respective constituencies. In the United States, this opposition comes from pro-Israel neoconservatives and the religious right. In Iran, it will come from clerics like Jannati, who link better relations with the United States to a threat to their authority. In the immediate term, it is still unclear whether Jannati's posturing will yield the desired outcome in the Feb. 20 parliamentary elections. What is certain from all of this, however, is that the modernists have shifted the locus of the debate to one among the traditionalists themselves.