Intelectuales y Académicos

“Diplomacia de la Proliferación: el juego que juegan las Naciones”

Autor: Immanuel Wallerstein - Comentario 132 -

Fecha: 28/3/2004

Traductor: Juan O

Fuente: Fernand Braudel Center

Commentary No. 132, Mar. 1, 2004
"Proliferation Diplomacy: The Games Nations Play"


The headlines in recent months have been full of nuclear diplomacy. It is hard to keep a straight face reading them. Libya has renounced making nuclear bombs forever. Pakistan's nuclear hero, Abdel Qadeer Khan, has confessed that he (and he alone in Pakistan) has been selling nuclear secrets on the world black market for two decades. General Musharref says he and the Pakistani army of course knew nothing about this. The Iranian government says it is not in the least interested in making nuclear weapons, never has been, never will be. The North Koreans haven't said anything new recently, but when last heard from, claimed they already were a nuclear power. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed el-Baradei, says he's amazed to discover the details of a large international smuggling ring in nuclear equipment. The CIA says it's learning all sorts of new things it never knew before. And Malaysia says it's anxious to cooperate in closing down any role its citizens or residents may have played in this worldwide smuggling operation.
Frankly, I believe almost nothing of this. Everyone knows everything, or almost everything, and has for quite a while. Most countries are lying through their teeth. This is the game of proliferation diplomacy. In real life, North Korea and Iran are no doubt hard at work developing nuclear weapons. Probably other countries are as well. The Pakistanis have every interest in continuing to support this. To be sure, the American government dearly hopes that there will be no further proliferation by others, while it improves its own nuclear weapons with abandon. And the world's secret services (and probably the IAEA as well) know more or less what's been going on, and have known this for decades. Furthermore, there are a lot of people, in the Western world and in the rest of the world, who are making lots of money supplying this traffic and have every intention of trying to make some more. The U.S. also knows that its power to stop this proliferation is more limited than it would like. Israel of course has been an unavowed nuclear power for more than thirty years, and is prepared to do what it can to stop others from acquiring these weapons, especially hostile others in its region, like Iran. But it too can only do so much. Bombing Iranian facilities would be a highly dangerous maneuver on its part, albeit the Israelis as the last true believers in Realpolitik could decide to do it.
Not to put too much nuance into this, a number of regimes know that their ability to survive depends on their having credible threats, especially when neighbors have them. Take Iran. Imagine if you were running the country. You are surrounded by powers, many of them less than wholly friendly, who have nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Israel, and now the United States (with troops on borders east and west). You would have to be crazy not to develop nuclear weapons. And whatever else the regime in Iran is, it is not crazy. Take North Korea. Would you, if you were the North Korean authorities, trust the United States not to take military action some day? After all, only the fast-foot maneuvering of Jimmy Carter undid President Clinton's decision to do just that. And this "weakness" on the part of Clinton is one of the things George Bush's acolytes hold against Clinton.
So, if this is the case, why does everyone play these public relations games? Because they do serve a purpose. It's all a matter of continual pressure - to speed up or to slow down the process. And sometimes the pressures do work, up to a point. But the public language of the game-players never matches the private. Take Pakistan. The Bush regime has pressed Musharref hard on several fronts - to expose Khan, to permit the FBI to play around in northwest Pakistan looking for Osama bin Laden, not to support the resurgence of the Taliban, and in general to act like a member of the world team of those willing to support Bush from here to eternity. But of course, this is less than wholly popular in Pakistan. Many observers have noticed that every time Musharref makes a speech Bush will like, he dresses in Western clothes and speaks English. And every time he makes a speech that the Pakistani people will like, he dresses in Pakistani clothes (or in military garb) and speaks Urdu.
It's all a matter of dosage - give a little to the U.S. but not too much, give a little to the Islamists but not too much. How hard the U.S. presses is also a matter of dosage - pursuing its avowed objectives and satisfying its macho image at home, but not going so far as to jeopardize Musharref continuing in office since he the U.S.'s best hope that nothing worse will succeed him. The trouble with these kinds of games is that it's easy to make mistakes. Either Musharref or Bush could go a bit too far and the regime might topple.
And Pakistan's regime might indeed topple. There is also the question of India-Pakistan negotiations. The Kashmir issue has been around now for more than fifty years. Let us review what happened. At the time of independence, there was an enormous amount of ethnic purification on both sides. There was also a provision in the British transfer of power arrangements that the princely states (of which Kashmir was one) could opt to join the country that they wished. The only place where the decision was in doubt was Kashmir, with a Hindu prince and a Muslim majority, and on the frontier of the two states. The prince opted for India. A war broke out, and there was a de facto partition of Kashmir. Ever since, India has claimed the Pakistani portion and Pakistan has claimed the Indian portion. There have been three more wars about this.
Is there a solution that can be negotiated? The fact is that India and Pakistan actually feel differently about the situation. India would be willing to accept the de facto partition as a permanent division, although it doesn't say this publicly. Pakistan really wants to reclaim the Indian part, or at least a lot of Pakistanis really want to do that. So what could a compromise be? India won't cede an inch. Peace involves Pakistan accepting the borders as permanent. Musharref might be ready personally to do this, if some face-saving formula could be found. The rest of the world would probably applaud. But if he does this while he's disgracing Khan, and allowing FBI agents to roam inside Pakistan, this would probably be just too much for him to survive. And India does want him to survive, since at the moment he is their best hope of ending the border incursions.
So is India pressing the U.S. to relax other pressures on Musharref in order that he make a deal on Kashmir? And is the U.S. going to do this, given their own priorities which do not include settling the Kashmir dispute? Come back in 50 years when the archives are opened. In the meantime, don't expect there to be much slowing down in nuclear proliferation.
Immanuel Wallerstein