Latinoamérica

Bolivia: la huelga general no plantea una gran amenaza...

Autor: Editorial

Fecha: 1/10/2003

Traductor: Gloria S., especial para PI

Fuente: Stratfor

Bolivia: Labor Strike Poses Little Threat, But Presidency Shaky


Summary

A number of Bolivian unions, peasant farmers and university students
launched a national strike on Sept. 29 to force the resignation of
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. This strike likely will fail to
achieve its objective, but the president is unlikely to complete his
term nonetheless. A government shake-up could occur within the next
year unless the military steps in to support Sanchez de Lozada.

Analysis

Bolivian Workers Central (COB), historically the most powerful labor
union in Bolivia, launched an "indefinite national strike" on Sept.
29 to try to force the resignation of President Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada. Although the president is unpopular with more than 90 percent
of the country's voters, the strike probably will fail to force his
resignation because political opponents are divided and squabbling
over who should replace Sanchez de Lozada.

As a result, many groups seeking the president's ouster are not
supporting the strike, called by COB President Jaime Solares. For
example, only four of the COB's 64 affiliated organizations have
endorsed the work stoppage, La Paz daily La Razon reported Sept. 29.
Other groups, such as Evo Morales' Movement to Socialism (MAS), also
have declined to join.

This does not mean that Sanchez de Lozada's 13-month-old presidency
is secure, however. He has been in an escalating confrontation with
various opposition groups from the moment he assumed the presidency
in August 2002. Even if the COB push for his immediate resignation
fails, Stratfor believes that Bolivia will become increasingly
unstable over the next several months.

Many of Sanchez de Lozada's opponents are linking demands that he
resign to reported government plans to route a controversial gas
pipeline for the $7 billion Pacific LNG project to the northern
Chilean port of Patillo. However, while Bolivian nationalist loathing
for Chile is a powerful factor in the conflict, many of Sanchez de
Lozada's opponents are whipping up opposition to the Pacific LNG
project as a fulcrum to force regime change in Bolivia.

Their goal is to kill Pacific LNG and topple Sanchez de Lozada
simultaneously. Stratfor thinks the opposition has a good chance of
achieving both objectives: Sanchez de Lozada likely will be forced to
resign sometime in 2004 unless the country's military leaders declare
their support for his government. In fact, Sanchez de Lozada could be
forced out much sooner if he openly declares that Pacific LNG's
pipeline is going to Chile instead of Peru. The president recently
said he would announce his decision in December 2003.






Many of the government's most vocal opponents -- including Morales,
Solares and indigenous leader Felipe Quispe -- want to install a
government that would reject free-market economic policies,
nationalize Bolivia's energy and mining sectors, suspend U.S.-backed
drug eradication policies and likely even expel the United States
from Bolivia. Anti-American sentiment is much more virulent in
Bolivia than in other Andean Ridge countries, possibly because the
U.S. Embassy in La Paz intervenes more in politics than any other
U.S. Embassy in Latin America, including in Colombia.

In fact, after both Sanchez de Lozada and MAS leader Morales failed
to win a simple majority in the June 2002 presidential elections, the
U.S. Embassy in La Paz was instrumental in forging the ruling
coalition in Congress that gave Sanchez de Lozada the presidency. If
not for U.S. intervention in Bolivia's latest elections, it's very
likely that Morales would be Bolivia's president today, and that both
the U.S. government and Pacific LNG would have been booted out of the
country by now. As a result, many Bolivians are keenly aware that
Sanchez de Lozada is Washington's chosen president in La Paz.

It's not clear who could replace Sanchez de Lozada. The president's
MNR Party is currently the only political group in the country that
backs routing Pacific LNG's pipeline through northern Chile to the
port of Patillo. Every other political organization -- including
coalition partners like the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) and
the populist, right-wing New Republican Force (NFR) led by retired
military officer Manfred Reyes Villa -- are exploiting popular
opposition to the Pacific LNG project to position their parties to
seize power if Sanchez de Lozada is forced out.

This is a principal reason why COB president Solares's call for an
indefinite national strike has received lukewarm endorsements from
other opposition leaders. Although they all profess the same goals of
stopping Pacific LNG and forcing Sanchez de Lozada to resign, several
opposition leaders also are vying with each other to capture the
presidency when a shakeup finally occurs.

For example, Morales placed second in the 2002 presidential
elections, and his MAS Party is the second-largest political force in
Congress. The U.S. Embassy's intervention in August 2002 effectively
denied him a good chance of being Bolivia's president, and he does
not appear willing to wait three years to make another electoral try
for office. However, his known competitors include NFR leader Reyes
Villa, MIR leader Jaime Paz Zamora and indigenous leader Quispe.

It's also likely that dissident police and military officials are
maneuvering for a shot at the presidency. Several retired military
and police officers who oppose Sanchez de Lozada are backing the COB
leader's call for an indefinite strike to oust the president,
Stratfor sources in La Paz said Sept. 29. This support would indicate
that links could exist between members of Bolivia's military
establishment and mine workers who oppose privatizing basic energy
and mineral resources.

Ultimately, the balance of power rests in the hands of Bolivia's
generals, who have kept a low public profile as the country's
political instability has worsened. There are likely three reasons
for their silence:

1) Bolivia's military sector is probably under strong pressure from
the U.S. government not to waver in support for constitutional
democracy in a country that has experienced nearly 200 coups and
countercoups since it achieved independence from Spain in 1825. The
U.S. military and counterdrug presence in Bolivia is the second
largest in South America, after Colombia.

2) Bolivia's generals likely are waiting to see how the conflict
unfolds between Sanchez de Lozada and his opponents.

3) The country's military establishment is deeply divided over the
Pacific LNG pipeline controversy. Some generals reportedly support
the government's position, but others do not.

In a country where new military recruits must swear an oath of
loyalty that includes the phrase "death to Chile," military leaders
have to be very careful about voicing their opinions for or against
Pacific LNG. If the conflict erupts into widespread public disorder
and violence, and the military believes Sanchez de Lozada has lost
control of the country, it likely will step in to restore order.

However, the unresolved question is which faction of the military
would move first: the one that supports the president, or the one
that opposes him? For Sanchez de Lozada, the answer literally could
mean life or death.